China’s Asset Management Companies as State Spatial–Temporal Strategy by Ho, Sarah & Marois, Thomas
1  
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in China Quarterly published by Cambridge 
University Press: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25921  
 
 
 
 
China’s Asset Management Companies 
as State Spatial–Temporal Strategy 
Sarah Ho1 
Thomas Marois2 
 
 
Abstract 
Chinese authorities created four new asset management companies (AMCs) in 1999, which 
have since undergone profound transformations that have been influential in China’s 
contemporary integration into the world market. Conventional interpretations see these 
powerful AMCs in largely technical and asocial terms. By contrast, we employ a critical 
geographical analytical framework to understand the transformation of the AMCs as an 
expression of state spatial–temporal strategy, which involved attempts to create conditions 
of political economic stability now by displacing the conditions of financial instability and 
crisis into the future. This strategy does not come without unintended and destabilizing 
consequences, nor is it without class-based social and political implications. 
 
中国政府在 1999 年设立了四家资产管理公司，它们经历了重大变化，并对中国近年融入国际 
市场的过程影响深重。对这些庞大的资产管理公司的解读，一般都从技术性及非社会性的层面 
出发。相比之下，我们利用批判性的地理分析框架，把资产管理公司经历的变革理解为国家时 
空管理策略的表现。该策略企图把现存的金融不稳定及危机推延至未来，以制造现时的政治经 
济稳定。这策略的执行不仅藏有未遇见和不稳定的后果，亦为社会和政治上的阶级斗争带来启 
示。 
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The financial transformations experienced by the big emerging capitalisms like Brazil, 
Mexico, Turkey, India, South Africa, and China have been subject to increased study in their 
own right. A notable conclusion has been the variegated nature of each society’s integration 
into financial world markets. The focus therein has been on structural transformation. Rather 
less studied are the roles of particular financial institutions, that is, on the institutions 
constitutive of financial structures. 
 
This is our study’s empirical point of departure in the case of China. We seek to understand 
the emergence and transformation of China’s four large asset management companies 
(AMCs) vis-à-vis the society’s grander financial evolution. Each AMC was initially intended 
as a temporary institution destined to handle the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks’ mounting 
non-performing loans (NPLs): Cinda, for the China Construction Bank; Huarong, for the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; Great Wall, for the Agricultural Bank of China; and 
Orient, for the Bank of China. Yet as the AMCs enabled China’s global financial integration 
so too did the AMCs scale up their operations, thereby assuming a lasting significance. 
 
Theoretically we draw on a critical geographical framework, and in particular on ideas of 
state spatial–temporal strategy (SSTS). Through this analytical lens, we argue that the 
AMCs represent an institutionalized form of SSTS, wherein their malleable social content 
reflects political and class-based strategies. Over time we see that the AMCs have become 
constitutive of China’s financial transformation, but not necessarily as originally anticipated. 
This interpretation challenges mainstream accounts that often reduce China’s AMCs to 
technical problem-solvers, while engaging with critical geographical understandings of how 
financial crises are displaced. 
 
Three premises substantiate our argument. First, the SSTS analytical lens helps to uncover 
insights otherwise obscured by mainstream approaches. Second, China’s AMCs emerged 
as one of several possible state strategies meant to displace and defer escalating financial 
risks. Third, the newly-formed AMCs subsequently underwent three phases of 
transformation in ways first meant to preserve but then to intensify China’s financial 
transformation. These are followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
 
I. Interpreting AMCs as State Spatial–Temporal Strategy 
 
Employing a SSTS framework reveals insights into China’s AMCs otherwise hidden by 
mainstream approaches. Neoclassical studies, for example, typically frame AMCs in 
socially-neutral technical language as problem-solving institutions, wherein the largest 
problem has been the post-1980s spike in systemic banking crises and financial instability.3 
Notwithstanding other state-led rescue and recovery strategies, AMCs are posed as an 
effective policy response to rapid increases in non-performing loans (NPLs) and subsequent 
bank insolvencies.4 Understood thusly AMCs just absorb the failed banks’ NPLs (‘toxic’ 
assets) so these same banks can recover and resume normal operations.5 While in practice 
market interventionist, in discourse the AMC strategy is framed as market friendly: 
competitive banking can recommence while the prospects of economic recovery are 
enhanced.6  A win–win scenario. 
 
The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) dubs this the “good bank – bad bank” approach, 
wherein AMCs are described as “asset separation” tools.7 A new AMC materializes as the 
“bad bank” that institutionally firewalls the failed banks’ toxic assets.8 The recapitalized cum 
rescued banks are rebranded as “good banks” able to refocus on core business and 
financial sustainability, and therefore be attractive to investors.9 The AMC technical fix has 
emerged as a viable mainstream alternative to the otherwise massive and immediate 
liquidation of NPLs amidst crisis. Conceived of in apolitical and problem-solving terms, 
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however, the approach obscures underlying socio-political and often contested relationships 
of power and class. 
 
A SSTS framework facilitates an alternative reading. Bob Jessop defines state spatial 
strategies as follows:10 
 
These strategies refer to the historically specific practices through which state (and 
imperial) institutions and state managers (and the social forces they represent) seek 
to reorder territories, places, scales, and networks to secure the reproduction of the 
state in its narrow sense, to reconfigure the sociospatial dimensions of the state in its 
integral sense, and to promote specific accumulation strategies, state projects, 
hegemonic visions, or other social imaginaries and projects. 
 
As the “spatialities” of state are comprised of institutions and regulatory capacities tied to the 
“territorialization of political power”,11 it is useful to fill in such abstractions via concrete 
institutions like the AMCs. In this way state financial institutions, like banks or AMCs, offer a 
vantage point into the dynamics of the wider state formation.12 Further to this, we draw on 
Jessop’s notion of ‘institutional fix’ (and temporal horizons), which he specifies as:13 
 
“… a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, 
imposition, or chance evolution offer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, 
partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in 
securing economic, political, or social order. Nonetheless, it is not purely technical 
and, rather than providing a post hoc solution to pre-given coordination problems, it 
is partly constitutive of this order.” 
 
These analytical concepts have a long theoretical lineage within the fields of historical 
materialism and critical geography, the latter building on the foundational works of Henri 
Lefebvre and David Harvey. An advantage of this framework is that institutionalized 
responses to crisis, like AMCs, are not conceived of as the seamless, unmediated unrolling 
of structural forces, despite structures being analytically significant. Rather, social forces 
(composed of individual and collective agents) pursue socio-political and spatial strategies, 
thus producing ‘space’, to help realize their interests and to manage the contradictions and 
crises that recurrently arise in contemporary capitalism. While such strategies are 
predominantly undertaken at the national level, they are nonetheless integrally linked to 
global and sub-national scales and processes.14 
 
Temporally, state spatial strategies aim to ‘fix’ instability by shifting the financial costs and 
risks of ensuring current economic stability into the future. According to Jessop, should a fix 
succeed, so to speak, then “current zones of stability imply future zones of instability”.15 For 
Jessop, crises are never really resolved, just displaced: fixes contain crises and 
contradictions now, but only to have them reappear down the road and in need of new 
fixes.16 
 
On this point we depart from Jessop and others who see fixes as recurrently displacing but 
never resolving crises. Often in Marxian accounts of transformation and change, crisis is 
understood as “an essential and ineradicable feature” of capitalism that exposes its inherent 
contradictions.17 Fair enough. But if an analytical position posits that crises are never 
resolved, only displaced, this implies that capitalism is always in crisis. This empties out the 
concept of crisis.18 
 
By contrast, we see specific crises as resolvable, depending on specific circumstances and 
class relations. According to Thomas Marois: “the ways in which minor and major crises are 
resolved, or not, is historically contingent on domestic social affairs, state institutional 
capacity, relative balance of power between capital and labor, and global pressures”.19 
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Contemporary financial capitalism is dependent on state capacity to manage financial crises 
by pushing the costs into society: states socialize the financial costs and risks, thus resolving 
them20 (and here we begin to see the logic of Chinese state authorities turn to the AMCs 
amidst crisis). This resolution process by no means precludes new crises emerging. But 
neither should we overlook the political agency deployed, the flexibility of prevailing social 
logics, and class consequences suffered at moments of crisis resolution. 
 
Finally, we expand on Jessop’s approach by employing a Marxian-inspired social content 
approach to the AMCs. This approach is distinguished by its historical-structural and agent- 
led understanding of how institutions in capitalism are formed and reformed. Both the 
structural imperatives of competitive capitalism and the agency of individual and collective 
actors matter in ways that cannot be theoretically predetermined (hence, the very opposite 
of neoclassical economics). This understanding draws on two aspects of Rudolf Hilferding’s 
work (1981[1910]). First, through his focus on the historical social relations of power and 
class, finance capital is understood as a social and political force. Second, he highlights that 
progressive change is possible by social forces taking over and mobilizing banks. Building 
on these insights, our approach to financial institutions challenges conceptions that see 
banks as unmediated institutional derivatives of market processes or, for that matter, class 
relations. In short, not as a priori black boxes. Instead, a social content approach sees 
financial institutions like AMCs as “institutionalized social relations that reflect historically 
specific relations of power and reproduction between the banks, other firms, the state, and 
labor in general”.21 The remainder of the paper combines the social content and SSTS 
approaches. 
 
 
II. The Emergence of China’s Asset Management Companies 
 
The emergence of China’s AMCs is closely tied to China’s contemporary financial reforms, 
which began in the 1980s and involved moving towards a more market-oriented and 
commercial banking model. State authorities began by designating The People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC), formerly the only institution handling both commercial banking and 
macroeconomic financial policy, as the Central Bank in 1983.22 Authorities then created four 
state-owned specialized commercial banks from the PBOC – the Bank of China (BOC), the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – to handle foreign exchange, agricultural finance, 
infrastructure investment, and credit and savings businesses respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Chinese authorities further experimented with market-oriented reforms in the 1990s. One 
move in 1995 included turning the ‘Big Four’ banks into commercial banks to distinguish 
them from the three policy (development) banks created two years earlier.23 The government 
also began withdrawing budgetary support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), replacing 
them with bank loans. The Big Four banks became the main source of financing for China’s 
SOEs.24 This occurred as China began showing signs of structural economic change: 
between 1980 and 1995 domestic debt increased from 53 to 87 per cent of GDP; foreign 
direct investment exploded from $400 million (about 0.2 per cent of GDP) to $36 billion (4.9 
per cent of GDP); and exports tripled from 6 to 18 per cent of GDP (Table 1). 
 
Corresponding lending to SOEs absorbed from 20 to 60 per cent of the four banks’ assets, 
by various estimates.25 While this allowed state authorities to finance market reform, 
maintain SOE employment levels, and prioritize infrastructure, it also meant a substantial 
accumulation of public sector debts.26 In the wake of the 1997-98 East Asian Crisis some 30 
to 50 per cent of outstanding loans were non-performing, threatening to drag the Chinese 
economy into crisis unless action was taken.27 Official data shows this falling to just over 13 
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per cent by 2004 (Graph 1), which is still seen as extraordinarily high by most 
commentators. 
 
Possible strategic responses to the banks’ NPLs had already been discussed during an 
August 1994 Beijing conference, titled “The Next Step of China’s Economic Reform”.28 Zhou 
Xiaochuan 周小川 [then vice-chair of the BOC (and Governor of the PBOC since 2002)] and 
the State Economic and Trade Commission [(SETC) the top agency within the Chinese 
central government leading economic reforms in the 1990s] led the proceedings. The 
proposals focused on bank recapitalization and reducing SOE indebtedness, but without 
straining the national budget. Recommendations included converting the NPLs into SOE 
share capital to be held by the banks or the state (that is, debt-to-equity swaps).29 No 
immediate action was taken, however, as China was yet to confront real financial crisis, the 
likes of which Mexico and Turkey were then facing. 
 
The 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis, while largely skirting China, changed perceptions. 
This coincided with the transition of premiership to Zhu Rongji 朱镕基 in 1998, an adamant 
reformer, who quickly moved to consolidate power over the financial sector. This included a 
one-off injection of RMB270 billion (US$35 billion) into the banks to reach the Basel 
recommended eight per cent capital adequacy ratio. Still, the outstanding NPLs remained 
significant. Zhu Rongji called on fellow reformer Zhou Xiaochuan to come up with a solution 
– one that drew from the 1994 Beijing Conference and from which the AMC ‘fix’ would 
ultimately emerge.30 
 
Three points stand out regarding the intended design of the AMCs. First, creating a new 
AMC fix was not an obvious response. Instead their potential linked to the political rise of 
Premier Zhu Rongji and an associated ideological shift. China’s debt problems were to be 
addressed through a mix of fiscal spending and market-oriented measures.31 This marked 
the AMCs’ institutional content with a political and economic stamp of China’s 
transformation. Second, state authorities intended the AMCs to have a short life. Although 
not formally written into law, the official media widely reported on their ten-year lifecycle, 
which was affirmed by Zhou Xiaochuan32. The AMC bonds and debt-to-equity swaps, too, 
carried 10-year maturities.33 Third, the AMCs materialized with no clear blueprint for their 
future development or funding requirements.34 Official regulations only stated that the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) must prepare the final bill when the AMCs close but nothing 
bound the MOF to footing the bill. 
 
In 1999 China’s State Council finally approved the formation of four AMCs, each tethered to 
a Big Four state bank. The State Council intended the AMCs “[t]o prevent and reduce 
financial risks, provide a lawful disposal of state-owned commercial banks’ distressed 
assets, and strengthen the assessment of state-owned commercial banks’ operation 
situations”.35 Their primary mission was nevertheless the takeover, management, and 
handling of distressed assets extracted from the Big Four banks while their main operation 
targets involved the “maximization of asset preservation” and “loss reduction”.36 Profitability 
was not yet a prime directive. The MOF endowed each AMC with initial equity totaling 
RMB10 billion.37 This capital stake was evidently inadequate as the AMCs were expected to 
take over NPLs worth some RMB1.3 trillion.38 The additional funds would come from PBOC 
loans and AMC bonds. 
 
The emergence of China’s AMCs, then, is shaped by their unique capacity as financial 
institutions to displace financial risks gone bad (that is, the banks’ NPLs). This occurred 
spatially within the state apparatus, as the AMCs drew in, centralized, and concentrated 
otherwise geographically and institutionally diverse financial risks. It also occurred 
temporally, as the AMCs shifted current state financial risks into the future. These strategies 
worked together to stave off immediate financial crisis. 
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III. The Transformation of China’s AMCs 
 
From their establishment in 1999 to the listing of two AMCs in 2013 and 2015, China’s 
AMCs transformed in ways reflective of shifting state spatial–temporal strategy (SSTS). 
Three phases help to frame these changes: 1999 to 2003; 2003 to 2009; and 2009 on. Far 
from being mere technical agents of debt-resolution, the AMCs evolved to facilitate China’s 
integration into financial world markets. 
 
A. 1999 to 2003: Displacing NPLs 
The first phase of China’s AMC operations corresponded to their intended strategic purpose: 
the acquisition and financing of the state banks’ NPLs in order to preserve financial stability 
and enable market-oriented reforms. By 2000, the Big Four banks had transferred RMB1.4 
trillion (US$170 billion) in NPLs to the four AMCs, which the AMCs acquired at full face 
value.39 Not only was there no ‘haircut’ or reduction on the value of the loans absorbed, but 
the rate of interest paid was decent (the Cinda–CCB bond earned 2.25 per cent, see CCB 
2010). Up to 60 per cent of the PBOC’s NPL claims were shifted to the AMCs40. This intra- 
state spatial repositioning of debt enabled the banks’ bad debts to be displaced into the 
future. The Big Four’s new lending need not be weighed down by having to monitor the 
repayment of their old bad loans as past NPLs became reclassified as receivables. The 
scheme thus functioned as an indirect injection of capital by the state to facilitate the 
authorities’ strategy of market reform. 
 
It is worth noting that the Chinese authorities created “constructive ambiguity” around the 
official backing of the debts.41 Specifically, the AMC bonds did not carry an explicit state 
backing. Implicitly, however, investors understood that the bonds had implicit state backing. 
The AMC bonds consequently enjoyed a sovereign-like zero risk weight, which helped to 
improve the capital base of the recipient state banks.42 Still, by not affirming an official 
guarantee, the Chinese government avoided being economically burdened by the bonds in 
its public balance sheet in the here and now. State authorities evaded the issue of 
responsibility for any ultimate losses – be it the banks, the AMCs, the MOF, or the PBOC. As 
for the rescued banks, unhinging them from their NPL noose sent them on a path of 
skyrocketing growth and capital accumulation. Between 2005 and 2010, each of the Big 
Four banks were listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This as domestic credits 
ballooned from less than 90 per cent of GDP in the mid-1990s to over 140 per cent by 2010 
(Table 1). 
 
State authorities further intended the AMCs to undertake debt-to-equity swaps with Chinese 
SOEs. The SETC, part of the power base of Premier Zhu, designed and led the scheme.43 
First, the SETC identified appropriate SOEs. Selection was based on whether an indebted 
SOE was established during key eras of reform (and hence heavily indebted with policy 
loans) and/or whether the SOE fell into the group of 521 key industrial enterprises.44 The 
SETC list was then passed onto the AMCs for independent assessment and vetting. As the 
AMCs rejected a mere 3½ per cent of the recommended SOEs (for reasons unknown), it is 
likely that the AMCs had little autonomy to modify the list – itself likely pegged to a larger 
state strategy. The AMCs were then responsible for formulating debt conversion plans and 
agreements for each selected SOE, which the SETC reviewed for approval.45 In general, 
China’s indebted SOEs enthusiastically greeted the plan, flocking to be included.46 In total, 
district level governments had nominated 3875 SOEs. Of these, the SETC selected 601 for 
assessment by the AMCs, with 580 being chosen for debt conversion.47 The total loans 
converted amounted to RMB405 billion, representing 30 per cent of the policy-based NPLs 
transferred to the AMCs.48 As with the Big Four banks, so too with the SOEs. The AMCs 
managed the intra-state spatial displacement of the SOE NPLs in order to shift these 
financial risks into the future. The SOEs could now too undertake market-oriented reforms. 
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By the end of 2002, the four AMCs had disposed of a total of RMB301.4 billion bad debts 
(excluding debt-to-equity conversion) and recovered RMB101.3 billion, which include 
RMB67.5 billion in cash.49 
 
By ‘fixing’ selected state bank and SOE debt problems, the AMCs internalized the economic 
state strategies of the moment while simultaneously enabling the realization of state market- 
oriented strategy. This gave shape to the AMCs’ social content, initially derived from the 
political intentions of Premier Zhu Rongji. The realization of the AMC strategy thus helped to 
cement his reform agenda. According to one high-level interviewee, “Zhu values the power 
to distribute financial resources through loans and stock-listings, and he has used the power 
as chips in the political game”.50 The SETC mobilized the AMCs to help filter and handpick 
the industries and enterprises that were close to Zhu Rongji’s strategic outlook, thus 
influencing and shaping China’s transformation. 
 
The AMC strategy did not always work as anticipated. A 2003 survey looked at 24 randomly 
selected SOEs in northwestern China that participated in the debt-to-equity conversion 
program.51 Among these eleven were profit-making before the conversion. Nine of them 
remained profitable by the end of 2003, with six recording higher and three lower profitability. 
Of the 13 pre-conversion loss-makers, only one became profitable. Twelve others still 
recorded losses: eight reduced losses but four incurred heavier ones. While the AMCs could 
ease the financial burden for some and allow others to reform, the conditions of the 
industries, markets, and internal governance of the companies also mattered. Shift bad 
debts in time and space, yes, but perform miracles, no. 
 
Yet the AMCs were hardly a strategy confined to the national scale, coinciding as they did 
with China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001. The take-off of foreign 
direct investment marks this internationalization: $42 billion in 2000 soon paled compared to 
the $104 billion reached in 2005 which again paled compared to the $244 billion reached 
five years on (Table 1). Among other reforms, WTO accession also involved leveraging 
foreign competition to weaken domestic resistance to market reform.52 For example, to be 
WTO compliant the listing of China’s SOEs and banks meant adopting new corporate 
governance standards in the search for new, preferably international, investors as a way to 
deliver stronger balance sheets.53 And, of course, to draw in capital from abroad. If a SOE 
secured AMC restructuring support then international investors often saw greater value in 
the SOE, portending its potential global success and higher returns on investments.54 
 
At this point the benefits of the AMCs as SSTS appeared substantial, if not bullet proof, but 
the indefinite time period of the NPL resolution schema would generate unanticipated 
problems for state authorities. 
 
B. 2003 to 2009: Transforming the AMCs 
The AMCs were entering their fourth year, amidst a global economic upturn, but the State 
Council was becoming concerned with their future.55 Two major factors fed its concern. First, 
AMC progress in disposing of NPLs appeared to be stalling. While overall disposal volumes 
increased by about RMB200 billion between 2004 and 2006, the cash recovery rate was 
proving largely stagnant (Table 2). On average the recovery rate had reached about 22 per 
cent (with big differences among the AMCs), but this covered less than half of the AMCs’ 
interest costs (Table 2).56 State authorities worried that the AMCs would be unable to meet 
ongoing interest obligations or to repay the bonds as they matured in 2009.57 Put otherwise, 
the intra-state strategy of concentrating bad financial risks in the AMCs to push them into the 
future was confronting the fact that this spatial–temporal displacement had not meant their 
material resolution (or infinite displacement). Real financial commitments (and possible 
losses) remained, and these could trigger instability. Should this occur, the knock-on effect 
would be significant stress on the Big Four banks holding the AMC bonds. This risked wider 
market reform aspirations, hence generating concern within the State Council. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Second, WTO entry meant Chinese state authorities were obliged to open up the country’s 
borders by December 2006, notably to foreign capital in its banking sector. China’s step into 
the financial world market now had a date. To ensure that the Chinese state banks could 
compete, authorities targeted the end of 2006 for completing banking reform and disposal of 
the NPLs.58  Yet after the first tranche of RMB1.4 trillion in NPLs in 1999 to 2000, the Big 
Four banks still had RMB2.2 trillion in bad loans.59 This, together with the MOF’s resurgent 
victory in its power struggle with the PBOC, prompted a shift in strategic direction for the 
AMCs. 
 
By early 2004 the MOF had moved to assume leadership over China’s financial 
transformation, spearheading commercialization (meaning a greater orientation towards 
competition and profit maximization). This signaled a qualitative shift in the strategic 
orientation of the AMCs as temporary institutional fixes for NPLs.60 In February the MOF 
issued a “Request for Advice on Questions Concerning Reform and Development of the 
AMCs” to the State Council.61 In the Request, the MOF proposed using more market- 
oriented measures, like Cash Recovery Ratio and Expense Ratio, to evaluate AMC 
performance. Upon reaching set targets, an AMC could switch to a commercial operational 
orientation. The State Council approved the Request, marking a new institutional shift in the 
AMCs’ social content. 
 
[Insert Graph 1 about here] 
 
The institutional change brought operational changes. To meet commercial targets, the 
AMCs could make discretionary asset investments, undertake commercial bidding for toxic 
assets, and establish platform companies (for example, financial leasing, trusts, and so on) 
for the purposes of restructuring and disposal of distressed assets.62 By the end of 2006, all 
four AMCs had met their targets. This allowed them to complete their transformation into full- 
fledged, market-oriented financial institutions.63 What were once politically intended as 
temporary fixes for economic instability had now, in the context of China’s ambitions to enter 
financial world markets, transformed to embody a new strategic direction. In doing so, the 
AMCs would project themselves as powerful agents of Chinese financial engineering. 
 
The MOF’s strategy to transform the AMCs into a new tool of financial and economic power 
did not come without complications. For one, the MOF’s move to extend the life and scope 
of the AMCs involved politically-loaded fiscal calculations. The foundational SSTS to 
concentrate NPLs in the AMCs in order to displace them in the future was now coming of 
age. The intended closure of the AMCs within a decade, as originally envisaged by the 
PBOC, meant that the AMCs would have to start resolving the original losses in the here and 
now – but with the MOF footing the bill.64 That is, the losses would have to become fixed in 
time and space. 
 
Realizing presently the past NPLs concentrated in the AMCs was politically unacceptable 
and likely economically destabilizing. So when the MOF regained ascendancy over the 
PBOC authorities opted to defer the debt problem.65 In short, the MOF kicked the original 
‘debt can’ further down the road. But to do so the MOF needed a new SSTS. This entailed 
issuing notices to the banks and the AMCs in 2004 and 2005 confirming that the MOF would 
provide financial support for the bonds’ interest and principal payments. That is, the MOF 
would absorb part of the AMCs’ losses by again spatially displacing but now deconcentrating 
financial responsibility across the state apparatus. In temporal terms, when the AMC bonds 
reached maturity in September 2009, the MOF would extend their terms by another 10 to 20 
years.66 It would use China’s financial institutions to literally make time available.67 Debt 
displacement as SSTS had worked once, why not again? 
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The now more mature AMCs enacted the MOF strategy, justifying their renewed lease on 
life. Their accumulated capital and financial expertise signaled the rise of the AMCs as an 
influential socio–political force. Commentators argued that there was good reason for the 
AMCs to remain alive, especially as they may be useful for handling any future distressed 
assets.68 The four AMCs themselves lobbied hard in this direction, as evidenced by their 
frequent conference speeches and publications.69 This alone, though, would have only kept 
the AMCs on life support. More materially, the AMC spatial–temporal fix had contributed to 
making domestic markets and market reform, facilitating Chinese state authorities’ capacity 
to bring about world market integration. 
 
A significant factor, then, in the MOF’s decision to grant the AMCs new investment powers 
involved the changing reproductive logic of the Chinese state in governing a more market- 
oriented economy and capital accumulation.70 The influx of foreign investment, overseas 
listings of SOEs, and China’s internationalization meant the government could no longer 
control the economy as before. Indeed, this is reflected in the massive buildup of total official 
reserves (a form of state self-insurance against capital outflows) from $172 billion in 2000 to 
just under $3 trillion by 2010 (Table 1). Guo Shuqing 郭树清, past Chair of the CCB and 
current Communist Party Secretary and Deputy Governor of the PBOC and Chair of the 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, captured this transformative process 
when writing on the challenges before the Chinese economy:71 
 
The qualitative changes ... in economic operations ... indicated that, in terms of 
managing the economy, we could no longer rely solely on administrative measures, 
but instead had to shift to indirect measures to influence economic performance. It 
became impossible not to change the entire formulation and operating mode of 
macroeconomic policies in China. 
 
For example, with the stakes they already held in key SOEs through the debt-to-equity 
swaps, the AMCs were able to take up the role of institutional investor in strategic 
industries.72 This introduced a new form of ownership and control in China, wherein state 
authorities relinquished direct ownership while retaining indirect control through other public 
institutions, like the AMCs.73 
 
In transforming themselves and their spatial–temporal orientation during this phase, the 
AMCs facilitated changes within China’s internationalizing political economy. AMC 
transformation, however, was not yet complete. 
 
C. 2009 Onwards: Consolidating Commercialization 
The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 sparked a shift in Chinese economic 
development. China had limited exposure to the US sub-prime mortgages and was therefore 
less impacted than the US and Europe. The global crisis, nonetheless, inflicted a heavy blow 
to global demand. China, whose strategy of development over the previous 20 to 30 years 
had turned increasingly to exports and foreign direct investment (Table 1), recorded severe 
trade shocks. Its GDP growth rate dropped from around 10 per cent per year to 6.8 per cent 
in the fourth quarter of 2008, before rebounding. The Chinese government responded in 
November with an unprecedented RMB4 trillion (US$586 billion) stimulus package.74 Given 
China’s significance, foreign economists also recognized that bolstering its economy was 
key to prospects of global recovery. 
 
Government- and bank-led investments designed to boost domestic demand defined 
China’s stimulus.75 To this end, authorities instructed the state-owned banks to more than 
double their lending targets from RMB4.7 trillion in 2008 to RMB10 trillion in 2009, especially 
via infrastructure, new environmental programs, and consumer spending (notably 
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mortgages), and to reduce restrictions on corporate bond issuances and financial products.76 
These helped to deliver a 9.4 per cent growth rate in 2009 and 10.6 in 2010 (Table 1). Still, 
domestic demand was slow to catch up.77 
 
There would be unintended consequences to the stimulus. Pumping billions into the 
economy enabled investors with excess liquidity to turn to the stock and real estate markets, 
supercharging speculative activities.78  This gave rise to new problems of property 
speculation and mounting bad debts.79 That is, Chinese authorities’ attempts to displace the 
2008-09 financial crisis by mobilizing massive amounts of credit in the present gave rise to 
present and future conditions of crisis.80 This, in turn, would demand a new SSTS, which 
would again bring the AMCs to the fore of Chinese political economy. 
 
Resurrecting the specter of past crisis resolution strategies, commentators and AMC senior 
management highlighted AMC successes in handling the previous batch of NPLs and in 
restoring China’s banks and SOEs to economic health.81 The AMCs were being discursively 
framed, and increasingly seen, as “a stabilizing factor” in China’s unstable economy.82 In 
Premier Wen’s 2010 Annual Working Report, he specifically highlighted the need to build a 
sound financial system to withstand the shocks of the global financial crisis; this included the 
continued transformation and commercialization of the AMCs.83 
 
The AMCs had by this time stretched their operations into a comprehensive range of 
financial services – which included fund management, securities, insurance, futures, private 
equity, real estate, and trusts – in part by taking over ownership and control of insolvent 
financial institutions that held the relevant licenses.84 What the AMCs now needed was more 
capital to absorb the emerging NPLs.85 For this, the AMCs had to project their capital-raising 
capacities beyond China and into world financial markets. For that, the government 
strategized to publicly list the AMCs. Whereas before authorities were willing to displace bad 
debts domestically and within the state in order to push them into the future, now SSTS 
would assume an outward-orientation. This meant deeper commercialization. 
 
At the time, Cinda was the strongest performing AMC (its cash recovery ration of over 30 per 
cent was miles ahead of the others, Table 2), and so was chosen to pioneer the listing 
process.86 To do so, the government converted Cinda into a joint-stock company with the 
MOF as the sole shareholder in 2010, the usual first step for a Chinese SOE to get listed.87 
The next task was to deal with the original bonds issued by the AMCs for the Big Four 
banks’ NPLs. That is, authorities now had to explicitly resolve the first displacement of bad 
debts. 
 
In a 2010 CCB announcement (confirmed later by Cinda), the MOF agreed to continue 
providing interest support on the CCB’s Cinda bonds, with a book value of RMB247 billion.88 
The principal, however, was to be repaid by a MOF-owned but jointly-managed Cinda-MOF 
Fund. While displacing the bad debts once more, the MOF signaled a concrete amortization 
period by projecting them to last until September 2019. But where would the money to fund 
the Fund come from? From enterprise income tax paid by the CCB and ‘other 
appropriations’ made by the MOF.89 
 
The implications of this new state strategy are significant. Through MOF payments and via 
the CCB-paid enterprise income taxes, authorities could finally ‘fix’ or resolve the original 
NPL debt problem. The resolution is as political as it is financial, and it involves explicit 
socialization of the debts through the state apparatus. Socialization is here understood as a 
constitutive state strategy of neoliberal financial transformation whereby “state authorities 
diffuse the worst and most costly financial risks onto workers in society through the state 
apparatus”.90 This is possible because state authorities collect geographically diffuse tax 
payments within their territory, from individuals and enterprises to greater and lesser 
degrees, concentrating the payments in the public purse to be later dispersed. Governments 
11  
can borrow against this because they collect taxes. Taxation links public expenditure to the 
general public and, as such, public expenditure decisions are politically loaded. As per the 
AMCs, for authorities to explicitly resolve the initial bonds meant firmly committing public 
resources: namely, the taxes paid by the CCB and other MOF ‘appropriations’. These public 
resources would enable the further market-oriented commercialization of their social content. 
And this commercialization was being financed via socialization, which enabled the AMCs 
(and by extension state authorities) to respond to the current crisis. 
 
The socialization of bad debts is distinctly class-based insofar as public sectors resources 
and taxation funds their resolution. As one BIS economist understands it (albeit not in class 
terms) vis-à-vis China’s system-wide resolution of China’s debts (not just the AMCs):91 
 
Thus, taxpayers, shareholders and bank customers have all shared the restructuring 
bill. The MoF and PBC together have taken care of 85 per cent of the bill, with the 
rest of the tab being picked up by bank shareholders, investors and customers. 
Therefore, the consolidated public sector (ultimately the taxpayers) is bearing the 
lion’s share of the overall bill. 
 
Upon clearing the way for settling cum socializing the bond obligations, Cinda AMC opened 
to strategic investors in April 2012. These included the National Social Security Fund of 
China, UBS, CITIC, and Standard Chartered, who together held 16.54 per cent of Cinda 
before its listing92. Cinda was then floated on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in December 
2013. It raised US$2.5 billion and was crowned the largest IPO of the year.93 Cinda’s 
commercial outputs skyrocketed (Table 3). Total assets have more than quadrupled as net 
profits doubled from 2012 to 2016. Cinda’s ROAA and ROAE measures have slipped since 
2012, given current debt problems, but current levels (1.82 & 14.12 respectively, Table 3) 
still locate it among the top financial performers globally. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The Huarong AMC was listed in October 2015 raising $2.3 billion, and its commercialization 
has delivered even more dramatic commercial results (Table 3). Total assets have ballooned 
four and a half fold with net profits more than tripling. Huarong’s returns have remained 
steady since 2012. At 18.4 per cent ROAE and 2.0 per cent ROAA, it steadily outperforms 
Cinda. 
 
As for the two other AMCs, Great Wall and Orient, the former completed restructuring into a 
joint-stock company in December 2016 while the latter is in the process of doing so, both 
paving the way for an eventual listing – which as of early 2018 is officially unconfirmed.94 
Further commercial changes are likely as the AMCs explore rebranding themselves as 
investment banks with ambitions of competing globally with the likes of Goldman Sachs and 
JP Morgan.95 As financial instability continues to loom across China’s economic horizon,96 
the place of the AMCs in China’s state financial apparatus appears assured. 
 
In this phase we see how SSTS can manifest differently. In the context of global financial 
instability and commercialisation pressures, past implicit official guarantees needed to be 
replaced by explicit official guarantees and payment schemes that spatially dispersed the 
NPLs risks onto society through the state apparatus in order to fix a date of resolution. 
Socializing the past bad debts opened the door to drawing in new private investors and 
commercialization, with resulting dividends being paid out. This further altered the original 
intended social content of the AMCs. The Chinese AMCs continue to feed on bad debts, as 
China sells off further tranches of NPLs. Now, however, the AMCs and their investors are 
watching closely. This is not just to see how they might contribute to managing financial 
instability within China’s borders. Investors are also wondering how they might be able to 
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exercise their spatial–temporal toolkit to generate lucrative new sources of capital 
accumulation. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: The Significance of China’s AMCs 
 
Viewed through a lens of state spatial–temporal strategy (SSTS) China’s AMCs become 
much more than just technical problem solvers. Rather they reveal themselves as complex 
and malleable institutionalizations of political and economic struggles, which themselves 
have class-based determinations. While first conceived of as temporary and implicit fixes for 
China’s NPL problems of the 1990s, market-oriented restructuring during the 2000s meant 
the AMCs became targets for and agents of capital accumulation. The lure of foreign 
investment influenced changes in the AMCs. State authorities modified its approach to 
SSTS in the AMCs to explicitly resolve their past NPLs dealings by socializing them over a 
fixed term and across society. This ‘fix’ provided private investors with the rock-solid 
certainty they needed to buy into the commercializable AMCs. This enabled the listed AMCs 
to project their debt management dealings beyond the confines of China’s borders and into 
financial world markets. In ways unanticipated during their initial formation, debt 
displacement has thus become an accumulation strategy in and of itself as an unintended 
but nevertheless core feature of the AMCs’ social content. The AMCs now function at the 
center of China’s strategy to manage ever-new financial risks going bad, within a system of 
financial capitalism characterized by recurrent crises. The AMCs thus figure as one 
historically-specific institutional dimension constitutive of a much larger international financial 
structure. 
 
Our interpretation challenges both mainstream and critical interpretations. For one, 
mainstream approaches hold fast to neoclassical tenets that, a priori, pose state-owned and 
public institutions as inherently inefficient. China’s AMCs fundamentally undermine 
propositions that only ‘depoliticized’ financial institutions can handle bad debts and function 
effectively. They clearly can handle them effectively, however, this is done more in the 
private rather than public interest. For another, our interpretation suggests that crises and 
instabilities can be fixed and resolved – given political capacity to socialize the costs. To be 
sure, new financial risks and crises arise and can be displaced in time and space, as seen in 
China. But the concrete foundations of crisis should not be attributed to some original crisis 
that is then indefinitely displaced via subsequent spatial–temporal maneuvers – with that 
same initial crisis lurking ever-present ready to rear its head once more. This obscures the 
exploitative and class-based nature of how state authorities have pushed financial risks 
gone bad onto society through the state apparatus in ways that disproportionately benefit the 
reproduction of financial capitalism and private accumulation interests. 
 
It would be a mistake, by way of closing, to draw from our study that only pro-market, pro- 
capital social forces can form and reform the social content of state financial institutions (or 
wider state apparatus) to their benefit. Instead, who shapes and benefits from state 
institutions is subject to historically specific struggles themselves influenced by structural 
and conjunctural political economic forces, which cannot be predetermined. If pro-market 
forces can shape a financial institution (more or less) to a desired end, so too can popular 
democratic forces. There is nothing guaranteeing a socially progressive end, but then again 
there is nothing guaranteeing its failure (except the failure to try). Indeed, by theoretically 
and concretely dismantling the fixed and ahistorical categories of mainstream economic 
theory a whole world of historically informed empirical research into the potential of financial 
institutions becomes not only possible, but desirable. 
 
The significance of this insight is urgent. China is mobilizing massive financial resources 
(some $900 billion) towards spatial transformation vis-à-vis regional infrastructure (that is, 
the Belt and Road Action Plan). So too is China a lead investor in a promised green 
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transformation. Who will benefit? Who will define or redefine the social content of these state 
spatial–temporal strategies? These are questions hardly limited to China but must too be 
asked of the many powerful and influential state financial institutions around the world. 
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